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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
GLEN L. NICEWINTER, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
DAVID H. NICEWINTER and 
GENEVA C. NICEWINTER, 
fJefendants and Appellants. 
MARIE M. DIENER, 
Defendant. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Case No. 7669 
Respondent agrees with the Statement of Facts in 
appellants' brief in so far as they are set forth from 
the record. However, this controversy ~arises out of the 
interpretation of a joint venture agreement between two 
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brothers, but in appellants' Statement no facts are set 
forth concerning the inducement which pursuaded plain-
tiff to join defendant in his apartment house venture 
and nothing is set forth as to the terms and provisions 
of their agreement except these meagre words: 
''An understanding was reached as a result 
of these discussions on or about the 23rd day of 
February, 1948." 
Since this appeal grows out of the provisions of 
that understanding as interpreted by Judge Ellett and 
the enforcement responsibilities thereof as interpreted 
by Judge Van Cott, we believe that a more amplified 
statement of its primary provisions would be helpful, 
and believe these two provisions are fundamental, to 
wit: 
It is agreed between plaintiff Glen L. Nice-
winter and defendant David H. Nicewinter that 
all money and the value of the property supplied 
by plaintiff would be repaid to him and that he 
would not lose anything. 
It was also understood between said brothers 
that the said property should be sold to the best 
advantage and thereupon an accounting should 
be made between them in accordance with the 
foregoing terms of their agreement (R. 7 and 
8, par. 8-9). 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
Respondent will answer and argue the nine points 
posed by the appellants in the order set forth and argued 
in appellants' brief. The first three of these points are 
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grouped and argued together (although in their argu-
ment they are presented in ~a different order: 2, 3, 1), 
and points No. -! and 5 are also grouped and argued 
together. Respondent will ansvver and argue said points 
in the same order they are presented as p·oints in argu-
ment and the saine gToupings ~a.s adopted by appellants. 
In addition, respondent contends that this appeal 
is abortive in that it is concerned with an interlocutory 
decree which contemplates and provides for a sub-
sequent and final judgment. 
POINTS NO's 1, 2 AND 3 
Following appellants' example, respondent groups 
these three points in the order argued by appellants: 
ARGUMENT 
POINTS NO's 2, 3 AND 1 
App·ellants' argument is presented in sequence of 
Point 2, Point 3, and Point 1, being concerned in that 
sequence with Judge Van Cott's Findings of F.act, Con-
clusions of Law, and Decree, respectively. Therefore, 
for ready comparison, we feel constrained to follow the 
same order: 
POINT NO. 2 
(re: Findings of Fact) 
APPELLANTS' CONTENTION THAT THE TRIAL 
COURT ERRED IN MAKING AND ENTERING PARAGRAPH 
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11 OF THE FINDINGS OF FACT (R. 23), THE SAME BEING 
UNSUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE . 
. The text of paragraph 11, R. 23, follows: 
' '11. That said decree further provided that 
plaintiff should be repaid all monies and property 
which he has put into said enterprise in the event 
there was not enough to repay both of them for 
all their ,contributions thereto, and said monies 
and property to be repaid has been determined 
by Decree of this court to be adjudicated to be 
a sum of $8,000.00 to be repaid in the event there 
was not even enough to repay both of them for 
all their contributions thereto.'' 
Answering, we submit excerpts from the text of 
Judge Ellett's D·ecree and Findings and Conclusions: 
''It is further ordered, adjudged and decreed that so 
far as p·ossible there shall be repaid to Glen L. Nice-
winter ~all monies and property which he has put into 
said enterprise in the event there is not enough to repay 
said venturers for all their contributions." (R. 5). 
'' 8. It was also agreed between plaintiff Glen L. 
Nicewinter and defendant David H. Nicewinter that 
all money and the value of the property supplied by 
plaintiff would be repaid to him and that he would not 
lose anything" (R. 7). 
"6. That the plaintiff did pay into said firm in 
cash and the purchase of materials the sum of $8,000.00 
* * * " ( R. 7) . 
''That defendant David H. Nicewinter further agreed 
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that plaintiff would not lose any of the money which 
he contributed to said joint venture***" (R. 8). 
Respondent subn1its that the said quotations from 
R. 5, R. 7, and R. 8 amply sup.port Judge Van Cott's 
Findings of Fact concerned in Point 2, if only Judge 
Van Cott's reference to Judge Ellett's "Decree" is 
construed liberally and according to its obvious intent 
to embrace Judg~e Ellett's ''Findings" and "Conclu-
sions.'' 
At the trial the appellants were hoth present in 
person and represented by counsel and it was their 
burden to proceed with an attack upon plaintiff's prima 
facie showing \Yhich they had admitted by paragraph 
1 of their ansvver (R. 10). This express admission ·obvi-
ated the necessity of plaintiff proving these faets "as 
a solemn ~admission by the adverse party is the highest 
form of proof.'' Gatrell vs. Salt Lake Oownty (106 Utah 
409, 149 P (2nd) 827). 
POINT NO.3 
(re: Conclusion of Law) 
APPELLANTS' CONTENTION THAT THE TRIAL 
COURT ERRED IN MAKING AND ENTERING PARAGRAPH 
1 OF THE CONCLUSIONS OF LAW (R. 23), THE SAME 
BEING UNSUPPORTED BY THE FINDINGS O·F FACT OR 
THE EVIDENCE. 
The text of par. 1, R. 23 follows: 
''That all interest of Glen L. Nice winter and 
David H. Nicewinter and Geneva C. Nicewinter 
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in and to the hereinafter described real property 
together with the contract for the purchase there-
of from Marie M. Diener should be sold to the 
highest bidder of the said Glen L. Nicewinter and 
David H. Nicewinter in ,open court f.or cash and 
that the liquidated sum of $8,000.00 due to the 
said Glen L. Nicewinter may be app~lied as cash 
in the bidding at said sale, and***" 
Except for the limitation as to bidders, all of this 
text is sustained by Judge VanCott's Findings of Fact, 
and the new element of limiting the bidders to the 
brothers is sustained by respondent's stipulation (R. 
20) "that the above entitled court by said judge may sell 
said property and all interest therein to the highest 
bidder as between plaintiff Glen L. Nicewinter and 
David H. Nicewinter as defendant.'' 
POINT NO. 1 ( re: Decree) 
,• 
APPELLANTS' CONTENTION THAT THE TRIAL 
COURT ERRED IN MAKING AND ENTERING ,PARAGRAPH 
1 OF THE DECREE (R. 30, 31), THE SAME BEING UNSUP-
PORTED BY THE EVIDENCE. 
Text of paragraph 1 ·of the Decree (R. 30, 31) 
follows: 
''IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED 
AND DECREED that all interest of Glen L. Nice-
winter and David H. Nicewinter and Geneva C. 
Nicewinter in and to the real property located 
in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, and described 
hereinafter be sold to the highest bidder as be-
tween the said Glen L. Nicewinter and David 
H. Nicewinter in open court for cash, and that 
the liquidated sum of $8,000.00 due to the said 
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Glen L. Nice,vinter as adjudged by this court by 
Decree dated the 28th day of April, 1950, may 
be applied by him as cash in bidding at said sale, 
and***" 
Judge Van Cot,t's Decree follows logically out ·Of his 
Conclusions above and it is thus amply supported. 
The above quotations from Judge Ellett's Judgment, 
including his Finding·s and Conclusions, were all admitted 
by appellants (R. 10) and, taken 1a.s a group, amply sus-
tain Judge Van Cott's Decree ~of Sale. Respondent 
admits that the use of the words "as adjudged by this 
court by Decree'' in Judge VanCott's Decree and Find-
ings above are used loosely to embrace Judge Ellett's 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, but submits 
that the objection is only technical, does not overcome 
the result that the facts were found in judicial process 
and admit~ted (R. 10) by appellants. Judge Ellett's 
Findings and Decree 1a.re no~· now before this court 
for review, and, for the purposes :of this appeal from 
Judge VanCott's order of sale, the Judgment (Findings, 
Conclusions and Decree) of Judge Ellett is conclusive. 
Appellants go wholly outside of ~the record in drag-
ging in an assertion that appellant D1a.vid H. Nicewinter 
has an investment in excess of $12,000.00. The record 
indicates that appellant has paid in but $2,500.00 (R. 19), 
but it is admitted that respondent has paid in $8,000.00 
(R. 7, R. 10). Other than those investments the record 
indicates that their contributions are equal (R. 8). 
Under these circums1tances it would be "unjustly 
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advantageous" (Ap. Bf. p. 11) to appellants to deprive 
respondent of the benefits of his bargain (R. 7, par. 8). 
Appellants find in the stipulation (R. 20) no justi-
fication for making available to respondent the $8,000.00 
credit. We rely upon the findings of Judge Ellett for 
the $8,000.00 credit, not upon the stipulation. We do rely 
on the stipulation to answer any objections to the sale 
which Geneva C. Nicewinter might have by reason of a 
statutory interest or otherwise. Answering the objection 
that the stipulation was not executed by the parties 
but by counsel it must be presumed that their counsel 
acted only after consultation and approval of their 
·clients; especially in view of the record (R. 33, 34), 
wherein the objections filed made no attempt to repudiate 
or disavow the stipulation. 
The doubt raised by counsel as to whether the stipu-
lation refers to ~the same contract as that introduced in 
evidence is captious. It has the same date, the s'ame 
seller, the same purchaser David H. Nicewinter and the 
substitution of Glen L. Nicewinter for Geneva C. Nice-
winter by mutual agreement indicates that the parties 
litigant conceded that by the proceedings before Judge 
Ellett, Geneva's interest in said contract was only nomi-
nal but that Glen's interest therein had been established 
as incident to the establishment of his admitted one-half 
intereS't in the said joint venture with David. 
Equally ·captious is the ·objection that Marie M. 
Diener is not a party to the stipulation. That ''she most 
certainly has a direct interest in the proceedings'' was 
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manifest by her p·resence in court and her testimony at 
the time set for the sale (R. 44-49). Her right to have 
paid to her the balance of $2,900.00 and interest owing 
her for her vendor's ti1tle in said real property has never 
been questioned and all rights of the other par~ties liti-
gant are recognized as subject to her first claim which she 
has set forth in a letter and statement of account (R. 
17, 18). 
C,ont:rrary to appellants' alleg~ation that Geneva C. 
Nicewinter and Niarie M. Diener's interests have been 
ignored it appears that respondent has gone out of his 
'\vay to see that their interests are given every considera-
tion. The sale of the property was subject to Mrs. 
Diener's interest (R. 31), and is ,only an intermediate 
step in process of a final settlement and when the case 
is finally determined the interest of Geneva C. Nice-
winter, assuming she has such any interest, and the 
interest of 1farie M. Diener will be fully protected. 
P,OINT NO.4 
APPELLANTS' CONTENTION THAT THE TRIAL 
COURT ERRED IN MAKING AND ENTERING PARAGRAPH 
2 OF THE DECREE (R. 31), THE SAME BEING UNSUP-
PORTED BY THE FINDINGS O,F FACT OR THE EVIDENCE. 
POINT NO.5 
APPELLANTS' CONTENTION THAT THE TRIAL 
COURT ERRED IN MAKING AND ENTERING PARAGRAPH 
4 OF THE CONCLUSIONS OF LAW (R. 24), THE SAME 
BEING UNSUPPORTED BY THE FINDINGS OF FACT OR 
THE EVIDENCE. 
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We present and argue these points as a group as 
did appellants. 
In No.4 the appellants cl,aim as unsupported by the 
Findings of Fact or the evidence the following paragraph 
2 of the Decree ( R. 31) : 
''IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED 
AND DECREED that said sale shall be conducted 
in the courtroom of Judge Ray Van Cott, Jr., at 
9:15 o'clock A.M. on Friday, the 9th day of March, 
1951, and that notice of said sale shall be given 
by serving upon the said Franklin Dunn Richards, 
attorney, a notice thereof at least five days prior 
to said sale, and that rthe property and premises 
herein referred to are described as : 
Commencing at ,a point 2 rds. North of the 
Southwest Corner of Lot 5, Block 18, Plat ''A'', 
Salt Lake City Survey, and running thence North 
4 rds. ; thence East 10 rds. ; thence South 4 rds.; 
thence West 10 rds. to the place of beginning, 
subject to and together with a -contract dated 
September 25, 1947, with Marie M. Diener, seller, 
and together with all furniture, furnishings and 
~appliances appertaining to said joint venture 
premises, and. '' 
In No. 5 appellants claim as unsupp.orted by the 
Findings of Fact or the evidence paragraph~ of the Con-
clusions ·of Law (R. 23, 24), which follows: 
''That the properrty and premises herein re-
ferred to are located in Salt Lake County, State 
of Utah, and particularly described as : 
Commencing at a point 2 rds. North of the 
Southwest Corner of Lot 5, Block 18, Plat ''A'', 
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Salt Lake City Survey, and running thence North 
4 rds.; thence East 10 rds.; thence South 4 rds.; 
thence West 10 rds. to the place of beginning, 
subject to and ,together with a contract dated 
September 25, 1947, 'vi th ~Iarie M. Diener, seller, 
and together 'vith all furniture, furnishings and 
appliances appertaining to said joint venture 
premises.' ' 
N ot,vi thstanding the "\Vords ''furniture, furnishings 
and appliances" do not appear in the previous pleadings 
they were always contemplated as incident to, and em-
braced within, the property of the joint venture. This 
is substantiated by (1) rthe stipulation (R. 20), and (2) 
the fact that this order of sale is an interlocutory pro-
ceeding looking to a final adjudication between the 
parties pending 'vhich the proceeds of sale of their joint 
venture interests are to remain in _the custody of the 
clerk. 
That the joint venture here involves not merely the 
real property but the personal }ltroperty 1thereunto ap-
pertaining has never before been questioned. Even at 
the time the defendants threw all objections they could 
think of at the proposed decree of Judge VanCott, it did 
not even enter their minds to object to the use of these 
words, ''sale of the furniture, furnishings and appliances 
appertaining to said joint venture premises" (See R. 
33, 34). 
The stipulation of sale concerns "property at 725-
733 South 2nd East, Salt Lake City, Utah" and the con-
tract incident thereto, and recites that said court ''shall 
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sell said property and all interest therein" (R. 20), 
under which inclusive w,ords may reasonably be included 
all furniture, furnishings and appliances appertaining to 
the joint venture premises. 
If it were claimed that "property at 725-733 South 
2nd East, Salt Lake City, Utah" was not the res of the 
joint venture, it is unthinkable that appellants would 
have neglected to offer that as a specific objection among 
their list of objections (R. 33, 34). 
At any rate, in the execution of this interlocutory 
decree wherein the proceeds of sale are deposited with 
the clerk, the rights of appellants are adequately safe-
guarded. Yes, even the res is preserved, because one 
of the parties litigant will be the buyer and will con-
tinue under the cour1t 's jurisdiction until final decree. 
Appellants cannot be prejudiced. 
POINT NO.6 
APPELLANTS' CONTENTION THAT THE TRIAL 
COURT ERRED IN MAKING AND ENTERING PARAGRAPH 
5 OF THE FINDINGS OF FACT (R. 22), THE SAME BEING 
UNSUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE. 
Text of paragraph 5 of the Findings of Fact (R. 22): 
"5. That said property is being purchased 
from defendant Marie M. Diener and that de-
fendant Geneva C. Nicewinter is the wife of David 
H. Nicewinter and has some statutory interest in 
defendant David H. Nicewinter 's interest there-
in.'' 
Counsel presumes that "~as a result of the written 
contract, Exhibit 'A' (R. 19) she (Geneva C. Nicewinter) 
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had a one-half interest in the real property.'' That 
might haYe been presumed until proved otherwise. 
Judge Ellett's Decree reciting that Glen and David have 
a joint venture in said property 1and that the profits and 
increase of value shall be divided share and share alike 
upon sale thereof, and that each of said brothers and his 
wife shall have reasonable living quarters out of said 
premises pending sale thereof" (R. 4, 5) sufficiently, 
and for the purpose of this action conclusively, overcomes 
the p·resumption that Geneva had a one-half interest 
in ~he real property, as claimed, or that her rights were 
totally ignored. 
POINT NO.7 
APPELLANTS' CONTENTION THAT THE TRIAL 
COURT ERRED IN MAKING AND ENTERING PARAGRAPH 
7 OF THE FINDINGS OF FACT (R. 22), THE SAME BEING 
UNSUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE. 
Text of parag·:vaph 7 of the Findings of Fact (R. 
22) follows : 
"7. This ·court further found that each of 
said brothers and his wife shall have reasonable 
living quarters out of said premises pending sale 
thereof and further ordered that within a reason-
able time said premises shall be sold to rthe best 
advantage and thereupon an accounting shall be 
made between them in accordance with the terms 
of this order, and" 
Appellants are correct in saying that they denied in 
paragraph 2 of the answer (R. 10) plaintiff's allegation 
that the parties ''shall have reasonable living quarters 
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out of said premises pending the sale thereof.'' How-
ever, in paragraph 1 of their answer (R. 10) appellants 
did concede : 
"7. that it was also ~agreed between plaintiff Glen 
L. Nicewinter and defendant David H. Nicewinter that 
each of them would have a reasonable living out of said 
premises for himself and his wife and that e1ach did so 
receive his living and board rtherefrom" (R. 7). But the 
winner of the argument as to point No. 7 would have only 
a pyrrhic victory inasmuch as the Decree (R. 30, 31) is 
entirely silent with respect to the subject matter of this 
point, nothing is claimed therefore, it is the basis of no 
order, and appellants are in no wise prejudiced. 
POINT NO.8 
APPELLANTS' CONTENTION THAT THE TRIAL 
COURT ERRED IN MAKING AND ENTERING PARAGRAPH 
8 OF THE FINDINGS OF FACT (R. 22), THE SAME BEING 
UNSUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE. 
Paragraph 8 of the Findings of Fact (R. 22) follows: 
"8. That a reasonable time has now expired 
but said premises have not been sold.'' 
Again appellants 'are correct in their statement 
that the allegrution of the complaint concerning this sub-
ject rna tter is denied by his answer. 
The only purpose for such a Finding of Fact would 
be to lay a foundation for the order of s1ale of the apart-
ment house property, but in view of appellants' stipula-
tion for sale (R. 20) such a Finding is entirely super-
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fluous and the Decree (R. 30) is amply sustained with-
out reference to, or support from, said Finding. 
In Yie\Y of appellants' pl'layer (R. 11), ''for a judg-
ment of this court terminating and dissolving the joint 
venture" and that "the subject of the venture be placed 
on the market for sale" it \Yas entirely unnecessary to 
support by evidence the proposition that a re,a.sonable 
time had exp.ired. Nor can appellants be prejudicej by 
the allegation that ''said premises have not been sold.'' 
If they had been sold we \Yould not be up here ... at 
least not until af1ter an accounting-a final decree-which 
must hereafter be adjudicated by the trial court. 
POINT NO.9 
APPELLANTS' CONTENTION THAT THE TRIAL 
COURT ERRED IN MAKING AND ENTERING PARAGRAPH 
9 OF THE FINDINGS OF FACT (R. 22), THE SAME BEING 
UNSUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE. 
Paragraph 9 of the Findings of Fact (R. 23) follows: 
''9. That defendant David H. Nicewinter re-
ceived approximately $400.00 per month gross 
rentals from said premises, for which he has made 
no accounting to plaintiff, notwithstanding plain-
tiff's demand therefore and notwithstanding that 
said business is a joint venture." 
Proof of plaintiff's having demanded 1a.n account-
ing appears in the record (R. 36, 37). Proof of a joint 
venture appears in R. 7, par. 4. Proof that plaintiff was 
entitled to an 'accounting is found in Judge Ellett's Find-
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1ngs and Decree (R. 4, 8) admitted by appellants (R. 
10). 
As to the $400.00 a month we allow that at this time 
we would have no more right to submit the ''For Sale'' 
advertisements published at 'a:ppellants' ins1tance ·con-
cerning the income from said premises than he has to 
allege, -vvithout any support, that appellant has made a 
$1~000 investment. 
For our opponent to )argue that rthis finding fails of 
support is one thing; but he goes far beyond, saying: 
''such finding ... we are advised is contrary to the facts'' 
(Ap. Bf. p. 19). This last statement questions the in-
tegrity, no1t merely the support, of the finding and sug-
gests that in fairness we be allowed to offer on this 
hearing on appeal, some tell-tale news clippings spon-
sored by appellants. 
But even if the court cannot take judicial knowl-
edge that nine apartments rut 725-733 South 2nd East in 
Salt Lake City would bring ''approximately $400.00 per 
month gross,'' and even if there were no support whatso-
ever for this finding, it is not fatal to the interlocutory 
order of sale here appealed from. 
The Conclusions of Law do not rely on this finding, 
no order results therefrom, nor is followed into the de-
cree, and as a result appellants are in no wise prejudiced, 
and in further proceedings which are provided for after 
the sale they will have ample opportunity to traverse. 
Our op.ponent acknowledges that ·the decree "con-
templates an ultimate accounting between these parties" 
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(Ap. Bf. 19), thus conceding its interlocutory ·character 
and its amenability to n1odification upon proof to be 
given before final deeree. Salt Lake ·City vs. Industrial 
Co1nmission, 82 U. 179, 22 P. 2nd 1046. 
RESPONDENT'S POINT NO. 1 
JUDGE VAN COTT'S DECREE (R. 30, 31) HERE AP-
PEALED FROM IS AN INTERLOCUTORY O·RDER OR DECI-
SION WITHIN THE PURVIEW OF 72 (b) OF UTAH RULES 
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE. 
Our rules of civil procedure provide for an 'appeal 
to the Supreme Court (a) from all final judgments, and 
(b) from Interlocutory ·Orders or Decisions. Respondent 
contends that the order of Judge Van Cott which ap-
pellants seek now to have reversed is an interlocutory 
order or decree. 
''Interlocutory orders or decrees are defined by 
Blackstone as 'such as are given in the middle of a case, 
in some plea, proceeding or default which is only inter-
mediate and does not finally determine or complete the 
suit."' Hirsch Co. vs. Scott, 100 So. 157, 158; 87 Fla. 
336. 
Now let's look at Judge VanCott's decree: Firstly 
it orders a sale. It describes the res to be sold. It refers 
to the incident real estate ·contract of vendor Diener of 
said· real rp·roperty, makes the sale of the real property 
subj_ect to said contract, and restricts the res to the inter-
es1ts therein of the contestants herein, it fixes the time and 
place of sale, provides the manner of notice, provides that 
respondent may use in bidding a cash ·credit previously 
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found o\ving him by another division of the same court, 
accedes to a written stipulation of all contesting litigants 
limiting 1the bidding to two persons: The p1arty respon-
sible for said debt, and the party who is entitled thereto; 
·provides that possession be given the successful bidder 
within a specified time. Finally this decree provides that, 
having ·complied with all the terms neXJt above ordered 
concerning said sale, the proceedings are nevertheless 
not final: They are only intermediate; and 1all the pro-
visions concerning said sale do not finally determine or 
complete the suit, in these final words: "the proceeds 
from said sale shall be deposited with the clerk of ~this 
court for disposition in accordance with an account to 
be subsequently adjudicated herein." (R. 31) 
The decree now under review is essenti~ally just an 
intermediate order of sale incident to, and precedent to a 
final adjudication winding up a joil1lt venture. It clearly .. 
comes within the Blackstone definition of an interlocu-
tory order or decree. 
CONCLUSION 
This interlocutory decree amply protects the inter-
ests of all persons involved either directly or indirectly 
specifying that all proceeds from said sale shall be 
deposited with the clerk of the Court for disposition 
in accordance with an account to be subsequently ad-
judicated herein and limiting the property to be sold 
to contestants who remain under the court's jurisdiction. 
Paramount policy of law is to permit litigants to 
obtain review of rules of trial courts, but there is also 
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the rule that cases shall not be appealed piecemeal or 
in installments, and what constitutes final judgment 
'vill be determined by a ppliCaJtion of these two rules . 
.Attorney General vs. Pomeroy, 93 U. 426, 73 P. 2nd 
1277, 114 A.L.R. 7 26. 
While it is true that a final judgment is not made 
by the constitution a condition ·precedent to the juris-
di-ction of the Supreme Courtt to entertain an appeal, 
nevertheless it is a condition precedent, except in rare 
instances, to entertaining the appeal because of the 
ancient policy of the law based on sound principles 
(modifying North Point ,Consol. Irrig. Co. vs. Utah ~ 
Salt Lake Carnal Co., 14 Urtah, 155, 46 P. 824, 826). 
Appellants are appealing from an interlocutory 
order without ever having complied with conditions 
precedent, that is, to serve upon the adverse party, 
and file in the Supreme Court, a il'etition to graDJt an 
appeal ''setting forth the order compLained of and the 
grounds and reasons for an appeal before final judg-
ment" as required by Rule 72(b) of Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. 
No order having ever been issued authorizing this 
appeal res;p·ondent moves that it be dismissed. 
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